Family Matters: Gendered Candidate Selection by Party Gatekeepers

Melanie L. Phillips
Chapter 6 of Dissertation
Under Review

Abstract

Despite the apparent rise in women's access to political office, women's descriptive representation has stagnated in many countries around the world. The demand-based explanations for such stagnation have largely focused on the role of voters. Yet, this conventional explanation overlooks the fact that women candidates must surpass another hurdle even before they are assessed by voters: they must be chosen as candidates by party gatekeepers or selectorates. In studying the preferences of party selectorates, I argue that greater attention must be paid to the family background of candidates. Candidates in many democratizing societies are not solely judged by their individual attributes; they are evaluated based on family attributes that are perceived in gendered ways. Drawing on a survey experiment with 1,339 party selectorates in Zambia, I show that family backgrounds are one of the strongest predictors of candidate selection for both men and women; they are also the most gendered. I find that women are differentially evaluated through family status and loyalty mechanisms. Party selectorates reward men in candidate selection for being the heads of traditional households. Women, on the other hand, are more likely to be rewarded when their families have histories of demonstrated partisan loyalty. I also show that the gender of party selectorates does not substantively change how candidates are evaluated: women selectorates show no gender preference for women aspirants, and like men, punish women candidates who deviate from cultural expectations. However, I demonstrate that an individual selectorate's level of sexist beliefs does condition how they view more masculine candidate attributes. Selectorates with higher levels of sexism favor men and those with lower levels favor women. Contrary to expectation, women selectorates have higher levels of ambivalent sexism than men.

Word Count: 11925

1   Introduction

Women in many countries throughout the world still have low levels of descriptive representation in political office. A common explanation for the inability of many countries to reach parity in political bodies is that political parties act as gatekeepers (Gallagher and Marsh 1988). Women, before appearing on the ballot, must be selected as a candidate by party gatekeepers or the selectorate. Existing studies of party selectorates largely suggest that party members replicate the biases of voters in discriminating against women (Fréchette, Maniquet and Morelli 2008; Crowder-Meyer 2013; Niven 1998; Bos 2011; Sanbonmatsu 2006), while some show that outright gender bias no longer exists (Teele, Kalla and Rosenbluth 2017). However, in new democracies, the closed-door nature of the selection process poses a key challenge to understanding the impact of selectorate preferences on womens political opportunity. Parties in countries that transitioned to multiparty politics more recently still tend to select candidates through opaque committee-based processes controlled by party members rather than open, transparent primaries (Siavelis 2002; Kasapovi and iber 2001; Leston-Bandeira and Freire 2003).

Understanding how women can successfully navigate candidate selection in new democracies requires taking a broader view of the sociological contexts in which selectorates choose whom to support for office. In this context, I focus on the political and sociological nature of family ties that candidates often rely upon wherever democratic politics continue to be based on personalized clientelistic relationships. Political parties are typically built through networks dominated by men that are unreceptive to outsiders, namely, women who are not connected to those networks (O'Brien 2015). As a result, women, more than men, often need to leverage their families political connections to get the name recognition, support, and resources necessary to compete electorally (Folke, Rickne and Smith 2020). This is especially the case in countries where citizens prioritize traditional family roles (Baturo and Gray 2018). Women who do have politically relevant family connections are more likely to access political positions and opportunities closed off to the majority of women (Richter 1990).

While women can use family ties as a gateway into elite political networks, I argue that parties

also use those familial ties as a heuristic for a candidates qualifications. Political families provide access to formal and informal advantages (Feinstein 2010; Asako et al. 2014; Smith 2012). They also allow selectorates to infer the qualities of a candidate based on the success of their family as a whole, assuming that qualifications like resources, education, and training will be similar among those within the family (Besley and Reynal-Querol 2017). These family connections matter more to women who are at an inherent disadvantage. Folke, Rickne and Smith (2020) show that women can make up for gender-based disadvantages by having dynastic family ties during candidate selection.

To extend our understanding of how party selectorates consider family ties in candidate selection, I explain how the family attributes of candidates shape their perceived strengths and weaknesses. I specifically distinguish between a family status mechanism and a loyalty mechanism in identifying how family ties have gendered effects in candidate selection. The family status mechanism suggests that there are double standards on the evaluation of a candidate's family structure; how candidates conform, or not, to normative family expectations (Tamale 2018; Clayton et al. 2019) This double standard, I argue, is consequential in candidate evaluations. I expect that women are less likely to be rewarded for conforming to normative family expectations than men, while also being penalized more harshly for deviating from them. By contrast, in terms of loyalty, women benefit from the benign chauvinism that depicts them as more faithful and devoted than men (Bem and Lewis 1975; Broverman et al. 1972; Bem 1981). Women are perceived to be and are, in fact, more likely to remain loyal and expected to stay within pre-established family networks such as those based on partisanship (Clayton and Zetterberg 2020; Thames and Rybalko 2010; Cowley and Childs 2003). In this respect, party selectorates are more likely to reward women for having a family history of partisan loyalty.

I evaluate the asymmetrical responses to candidates family attributes through a candidate choice experiment conducted in Zambia, which has regularly held multiparty elections since 1991. Drawing on qualitative fieldwork in Zambia involving over 90 interviews with party selectorates, politicians, and candidates, I developed a survey experiment that randomizes candidates individual and family attributes. I conducted the survey experiment among 1,339 party members who make up

the selectorates of the two major parties, the Patriotic Front (PF) and the United Party of National Development (UPND).

The results demonstrate that the family attributes of a candidate matter and they matter in a gendered way. Consistent with the family status mechanism, party selectorates reward men for being the head of traditional households. This reward reflects both a bonus to men who are married with children and a penalty to women who deviate from the traditional family. Women candidates, however, are significantly rewarded in comparison to men for having a personal and family history of demonstrated commitment to the party, that is, the loyalty mechanism. I further show that simply changing the gender composition of the selectorate — adding more women to the selector body— would not change the importance of family attributes or their gendered evaluations; it only eliminates the loyalty benefits while keeping the penalty women face for violating family norms.

Additionally, given that we expect societal biases to affect the way party gatekeepers assess men and women, I extend this investigation by examining the variation in candidate evaluations with differing levels of sexism. To do so, I use a modified version of the ambivalent sexism index, which "measures hostile sexism (HS), sexist antipathy toward women, and benevolent sexism (BS), subjectively favorable, yet patronizing, beliefs about women" (Glick and Fiske 2001, pg. 116). I find that an individual's level of sexist beliefs conditions how they view candidate attributes such as financial resources. Selectorates with higher levels of ambivalent sexism reward men for gendered attributes, whereas those with lower levels reward women. Further, I find women selectorates, on average, have a higher score on the ambivalent sexism index than men. Breaking this down, I show that men are more likely to have stronger measures of hostile sexism whereas women have more benevolent sexism.

The findings presented here contribute to studies of political gender bias by refining our understanding of the importance of family as a candidate attribute that party selectorates evaluate. The current literature studies candidate selection by focusing almost exclusively on individual attributes. The political importance of family has not been systematically included in experimental studies of candidate choice even though the family remains a critical political actor that shapes

4

important electoral outcomes. This study provides the first step demonstrating that the benefits a candidate derives from having a political family are ultimately moderated by their gender. Further, this suggests that, while some studies contend that women face no outright gender bias, the bias may exist if it lays outside the context of the individual. Lastly, it suggests that the recommendation to simply increase women's presence on selection committee in order to decrease gender bias may not in fact be the solution it appears to be.

The paper proceeds by providing an in-depth discussion of the theoretical framework arguing that family attributes affect candidate evaluations and are asymmetrically considered for men and women candidates. From there, the paper presents Zambia as a case and highlights qualitative support for the importance of family in candidate selection using interviews and internal party records. Following the research design, I present the results of the survey experiment. To conclude, I discuss the implications and contributions of this work.

2   Family, Loyalty, and their Effect on Political Gatekeepers

The conventional approach to understanding womens entry into politics is to assume that their prospects are critically shaped by their gender. Gender affects candidate evaluations because it is used as a heuristic to infer individual attributes. For example, women candidates are often assumed to be more compassionate and honest whereas men are viewed to be stronger leaders who are decisive and competent (Alexander and Andersen 1993; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993). Gender stereotypes extend past candidate characteristics into candidate policy preferences: women are expected to be interested in "feminine issues such as childcare and womens issues, whereas men are focused on more "masculine" topics such as economic development and national defense (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006; Alexander and Andersen 1993; King and Matland 2003; Lawless 2004; Paul and Smith 2008). Arguably, the way gender is used to infer a candidates ability may have greater impact (Fox and Smith 1998; Mo 2015). Lawless (2004) and Holman, Merolla and Zechmeister (2016) show that women in the post 9/11 era receive less support due to voters belief that they are

not suited to deal with a terrorist crisis.

However, the empirical evidence is mixed on the extent to which gender actually conditions candidate selection or vote choice. A meta-analysis of 67 candidate choice studies by Schwarz and Coppock (2021) shows that women on average receive a 2% gender bonus. Comparatively, for example, in both Brazil and Japan, scholars find a pro-women bias among citizens using choice experiments (Aguilar, Cunow and Desposato 2015; Kage, Rosenbluth and Tanaka 2019). There appears to be an overall bonus, or at least not a clear negative effect on women candidates based solely on their gender. Both Teele, Kalla and Rosenbluth (2017) in the United States and Clayton et al. (2019) in Malawi have shown that voters have a baseline preference to women, ceteris paribus. Nevertheless, even in their studies, the researchers find that voters still favor candidates that have traditional household backgrounds a social reality that disproportionately burdens women who must try to conform to the ideal candidate.

In most electortal democracies, however, the responsibility of candidate selection falls on the party selectorates, not voters. The search for the ideal candidate is rooted in both formal and informal party rules that are substantially structured by gender and has been shown to favor men (Gallagher and Marsh 1988). Drawing from feminist institutionalist scholarship, we understand that men and women are evaluated under different rules and expectations (Norris and Lovenduski 1995). Selectorates in newer democracies are often men, putting women at an outright disadvantage. And women in emerging democracies stand out as different due to their presence in politics being a relatively recent occurrence. Party members and leaders may therefore be expected to treat them as an outsider (Judd and Park 1988). Niven (1998) suggests there is a tendency to view an outgroup (i.e., women) as less qualified than the in-group one associates themselves with.

Given the importance of party selectorates in candidate selection, the literature also debates whether their make-up is a barrier to women's entry. Some contend that the more exclusive the selectorate is, that is the fewer individuals involved in the candidate selection process, the less bias women have to contend with increasing their chances at selection. Hinojosa and Gurdián (2012), examining Chile and Mexico, conclude that women candidates fair better in more centralized and

exclusive candidate selection systems. Alternatively, others show that widening the selectorate and increasing the number of party members in the process can increase the opportunities for women and other marginalized groups. Party-controlled primaries, especially in newer democracies with poorer party members, are often wrought with patronage and clientilistic expectations on behalf of the selectorate (Kitschelt 2000). By increasing the number of individuals involved ultimately undercuts the potential for vote-buying. For example, Ichino and Nathan (2016) show that by increasing the number of selectorates, Ghana's National Democratic Congress party significantly reduced barriers to women during candidate selection.

## 2.1 Gendered Family Qualifications in Selectorate Evaluations

The conflicting findings on the role of gender, the make-up of the selectorate, and how it shapes womens success in making it onto a ballot may be due to fundamental misspecification of the candidate selection model. In this respect, I note that families are almost entirely left out of most empirical studies of gender and candidate choice even though their connections, resources, and support, play a vital role in political careers across the world. Political families provide access to both formal and informal political networks, career, and electoral advantages (Feinstein 2010; Smith 2012; Smith and Martin 2017). Further, family ties are more influential in weakly institutionalized environments (Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer 2003), and they are important in determining benefits from political control during periods of transition or uncertainty (Vilas 1992).

When evaluating women and men as candidates, the party selectorate embodies the tension between partisan interests and societal biases. In seeking to act in the interest of the party by selecting the most electable candidate they must make assumptions about the individuals on the basis of imperfect or biased information. In this respect, a person's gender becomes one of the most easily accessible heuristics that selectorates might be expected to infer candidate qualifications. In contexts where traditional cultural norms dominate and a clear distinction between the archetype of an 'ideal' man and 'ideal' woman exists, the interpretations associated with the gender heuristic will be rooted in how one conforms, or not, to their expected gender role. This suggests then that

7

men and women candidates can be rewarded or penalized asymmetrically for possessing similar traits depending on how they align with their expected behavior.

Pushing this logic further, I extend our current understanding of how gender heuristics operate by conceptualizing the family as a candidate attribute – an attribute that operates differently for women and men. My claim is that party selectorates understand candidate's qualifications as going beyond the individual; they involve the family. In a context where civil societies are weak or individual resources are limited due to underdevelopment, political resources are often held within traditional family structures. I claim that a candidate's ability to pull from these resources, both tangible and intangible, is perceived differently depending on one's gender. Men are believed to have easier access to more masculine or patriarchal resources such as financial resources, whereas women can claim credit for those resources perceived to align with a woman's more subservient position in the household. As depicted in Figure 1, when a candidate presents both individual and family attributes to a selectorate, gender norms and stereotypes associated with those attributes will condition the evaluation given to the office seeker. I expect selectorates are more likely to value women who demonstrate family political loyalty because stereotypes portrays them as more loyal. Patriarchal norms also make it less likely for a woman to move out of this family network. I expect men to benefit from the value placed on being the head of a traditional household; a reward that works to also punish women who deviate from this norm. This ultimately results in asymmetrical evaluations of similar qualifications depending on whether the candidate is a man or woman.

Figure 1: Theoretical Argument Model

The manner in which families become embedded in politics varies considerably around the world. In some cases, political dynasties are so encompassing of the political elite that they form a dynastic democracy, such as in the Philippines, where more than half of the elected legislators and governors have a relative who has held political office (Querubin N.d.). In others, one family, like the Nehru-Gandhi family in India, can rise to control the dominant political party and hold the executive for decades (Mitra 1988). Political families can be more localized, as tends to be the case in Thailand (Kongkirati 2016). Families do not have to hold elected office but can act as political financiers. The Koch family in the United States exerts financial and political influence while never actually appearing on a ballot (Confessore 2015). Common across these variations is a shared set of family ties that allows them to exert candidate's political influence.

Given the primacy of the family in many countries, selectorates should be expected to evaluate more than just the individual candidate but the candidate's family as well. Besley and Reynal-Querol (2017) show that selectorates use dynastic ties to infer the qualities of a candidate based on the success of their family members. Gatekeepers are not unbiased evaluators; they bring expectations of family norms and hierarchies into their evaluations. For this reason, research recently has begun to show that having a political family affects women and men differently during candidate selection. Folke, Rickne and Smith (2020) show with data from Ireland and Sweden that dynastic ties are significantly more important for women when it comes to candidate selection. Women, they show, must rely on the reputational clout from family ties in low-information environments when they are newcomers. Gatekeepers then can be expected to consider a candidates family when evaluating them. This expectation leads to my first hypothesis.

H1: Party selectorates will consider family attributes when evaluating candidates.

The effects of family connections are not necessarily symmetrical across men and women. The family remains a gendered unit in most countries. Norms that restrict women to the home and private sphere are a defining feature of many patriarchal cultures (Khan 2017; Bleck and Michelitch 2018). Women from patrilineal ethnic groups in Africa, for example, are more likely to experience domestic violence and have less autonomy in the home (Lowes 2017). Marriage is itself often a

9

gendered institution that puts women in subordinate positions within the family unit, and womens household bargaining positions can significantly affect their ability to participate politically (Chhibber 2002). The effects of these gender dynamics extend into political behavior. In India, research comparing groups whose norms dictate wealth inheritance through the male line (patrilineal) or the female line (matrilineal) show that the gender gap in political engagement is conditioned on wealth inequalities (Brule and Gaikwad N.d.).

Acknowledging that the selectorates evaluate a candidate's family attributes, and that the family is a gendered unit, we must understand how gender conditions the interpretations of a candidate's family. We need to understand whether these interpretations benefit or harm the individual's chances during candidate selection. I argue there is a loyalty mechanism in which women benefit politically from their family's political history. And there is a separate family status mechanism through which the demonstration of a traditional family dynamic creates political benefits principally for men.

I hypothesize that women are rewarded by party selectorates for being from a politically active and connected family. Women are perceived to be more likely to remain within pre-established family networks such as political parties. Bem and Lewis (1975) early on identified that gender stereotypes dictate that women are expected to be and/or associated with being more loyal, dependable, and trustworthy. These theoretical expectations have held in reality with recent work showing that women are more likely to have higher levels of party discipline than men. In Ukraine, Thames and Rybalko (2010) find that women are more loyal to their parties than men. Cowley and Childs (2003)'s study in Britain shows that newer women MPs are less likely to go against party lines than men. Even in contexts where partisanship is heavily polarized, as in the United States, party identification has been shown to have a stronger effect on women legislators voting decisions than mens. These findings are consistent when looking at both institutionalized and weakly institutionalized party systems in Africa. Clayton and Zetterberg (2020), using a survey of over 800 parliamentarians from seventeen African legislatures, show that women report significantly higher levels of party discipline. Party gatekeepers prefer women who they know will not challenge party elites,

and therefore, will look for candidates who can signal party loyalty (Hassim 2003). Drawing on these previous findings, I expect that party selectorates will be more likely to reward women for their family political loyalties than men during candidate evaluations.

H2: Party selectorates reward women candidates more than men for familial political loyalty.

I hypothesize that men, on the other hand, are rewarded for being the head of traditional households. The reward reflects both a bonus to men and a penalty to women who deviate from the traditional family. Borrowing from role congruity theory, which underlines that men and women are subjected to varying norms and expectations based on their ascribed gender roles, there are different parameters for the 'ideal' candidate's family status depending on the candidate's gender (Eagly and Diekman 2005). As a result, women face backlash for deviating from cultural expectations of their prescribed gender (Jussim, Coleman and Lerch 1987). This double standard in the rewards for family dynamics is typically reflected in gender pay gaps in which men with families earn more than women with families (Polachek and Xiang 2009). Voters, research shows, follow role congruity theory: they prefer candidates that demonstrate traditional family profiles. This preference has been documented in established democracies like the United States (Teele, Kalla and Rosenbluth 2017) and in newer democracies like Malawi (Clayton et al. 2019). More than just being rewarded for conforming to family status expectations, women politicians are often penalized for not conforming to traditional family norms. Stalsburg (2010) shows that childless women are evaluated substantially lower than childless men, and lower than men and women with children. Bell and Kaufmann (2015) find that women receive lower candidate evaluations for not conforming to gendered expectations on motherhood and children. In the United States, men are far less likely to report that they believe having children makes it more difficult to run for office (Lawless and Fox 2005). The unbalanced effects of family dynamics likely contribute to the reality that women politicians, those who have been successful in candidate selection, are more likely to enter politics after their childbearing years (Dodson 1997; Thomas 2002). Therefore, when considering gendered differences in candidate evaluations, we should expect to see men and women rewarded and penalized

differentially for conforming to norms of family dynamics.

H3: Party selectorates reward men for demonstrating traditional family status while punishing women who deviate from the norm.

Extending the logic of my argument, I contend that we must consider the extent to which individual selectorates vary in the degree to which they believe in gender stereotypes and how they perceive women overall. Importantly, sexist attitudes can manifest themselves in multiple ways. As posited by Glick and Fiske (2001), individuals can hold both hostile and benevolent gender biases. Both of these manifestations, encapsulated in notions of ambivalent sexism, can create barriers to women during candidate selection, with hostile and benevolent gender biases hurting their overall evaluations. It is likely that individuals with higher levels of ambivalent sexism will view candidate attributes through a gendered-lens, weighing more heavily on perceived gender norms and expectations which place women at a disadvantage. We should expect that selectorates with higher levels of ambivalent sexism will have gendered biases in favor of men.

H4: Party selectorates with higher levels of ambivalent sexism will have gender biases that favor men, particularly for family attributes.

Women candidates are often at an inherent disadvantage in many democratizing societies because family dynamics and party loyalty present two costly and largely immutable attributes through which they are evaluated. In contrast to commonly cited political qualifications, loyalty and political history are significantly harder to hedge largely because they require a dedication of time. Election cycles typically encompass four to five years, and party loyalty is built over multiple cycles. Moreover, in systems where political parties are weakly institutionalized, it is a risky investment. Unlike financial resources given to parties or communities, party loyalty is sticky and cannot be easily transferred when changing political parties nor can it be given to multiple political parties at once. Additionally, the nature of family status, especially in context with developing countries with strong patriarchal norms, is not always at a women's discretion. As a result, we see women rewarded and penalized for costly attributes largely out of their control, creating barriers for representation that need to be incorporated into candidate selection models.

3   Candidate Selection and the Role of Family in Zambia

Candidate selection in Zambia is widely perceived as creating hurdles for women's representation. The process is a closed-door affair that relies on rounds of interviews at each level of the party structure. The interviews culminate in the selection of the candidate by the National Executive Committee (for a more in-depth discussion see Wang and Muriaas (2019)). [1] In 2016, the two dominant parties, Patriotic Front (PF) and the United Party for National Development (UPND), held candidate selection processes in each of the 156 constituencies for members of parliament.[2] Given the electoral system in Zambia, plurality single-member districts, candidate selection in party strongholds is the de facto election. For example, in Southern Province, where UPND is overwhelmingly popular, the party candidate is essentially guaranteed the seat.

The selectorate in PF and UPND is mostly made up by men, and they are selected through intra-party elections. Political power in both parties is centralized in a national executive committee. Each party has branches at the ward, constituency, district, and provincial levels across the country. The selectorates included in candidate selection are titled members of the party who are elected by the members of the level below at national party conventions. These titled positions, such as Vice Chair, form the local political organ in the area and are the decision-making members during the candidate selection process. Each level has around 24 members who can participate in the selection process. While there are specific positions held aside for women, such as Chairlady and Vice Chairlady, the majority of the remaining positions are held by are men. There are no intra-party quotas or measures to increase women's representation in these positions.

Candidate selection for members of parliament begins with individuals applying at the ward level for the constituency they would like to stand in and paying an adoption fee (typically around 2,000 Kwacha or $100 to $250). In the 2016 candidate selection process, there were low levels of women aspirants from the start. From the records ollected in the field in 2017 from the UPND

---

[1]Author Interview, Lusaka Zambia; 2016, 2017, and 2019

[2]Other smaller parties, like former incumbent party Movement for Multi-Party Democracy and Forum for Democracy and Development, did not have enough aspirants to hold official candidate selection proceedings and party bids went to any party members interested in standing on their party tickets.[3].

and PF party headquarters, I estimate that there were 1,212 applicants for positions on the ballot among the two dominant parties: 646 for the PF and 566 for the UPND. Of those, only 178 were women across both parties. Thus, from the onset, the aspirant pool only contained 14% women candidates. This was not a party specific problem, but rather the general trend across both parties. The PF had 102 women applicants, accounting for 15% of their applicant pool; UPND had 77 women applicants, making up 13% of their applicants. The constituency-level distribution for each party is mapped in Figure 2 and Figure 3, where constituencies marked in grey are areas that had at least one woman apply for consideration.[4] These 178 women would go on to be interviewed by elected party members at the ward, constituency, district, and provincial levels. Interviews are conducted by titled party members and typically contained topics of political support, campaign resources, and party history.

Figure 2: Women and the 2016 Candidate Selection Process - UPND

Final candidate selection is done by the national executive committee. Provincial chairman from the ten provinces come to present their preferred candidates, along with written recommendations from each constituency, to the national executive committee. The national executive committee is not obligated to select the preferred candidate, and can even impose a candidate who did not

[4]Note: the maps are based on pre-2016 constituency lines but are mostly accurate.

Figure 3: Women and the 2016 Candidate Selection Process - PF

attend an interview. These decisions are often justified by the argument that the national executive committee collected information through a secret investigation. Of the 178 women who applied for adoption in 2016, only 56 women ended up being selected by either of the two parties: PF adopted 28 (16%) women and UPND 27 (19%). The constituencies in which women were selected are represented by horizontal lines in Figure 2 and Figure 3.

It should be noted that voter preferences only come into play after the pool of 178 politically ambitious women is whittled down into 56 candidates. Largely determined by what party ticket they were on, 25 women were elected in the 2016 election 13 under PF and 12 under UPND. [5] Women in parliament now account for 17% of all MPs.

3.1 Family, Loyalty, and Candidacy in Zambia

Political loyalty is a valuable and sought-after attribute in Zambia. Intra-party conflict and defection are common, causing instability within political parties. In the 2016 elections, 71 of the 432

---

[5]It is important to note that this number has fluctuated due to changes in seats caused by death and by-elections

candidates for parliament defected from another party (Arriola et al. 2021). Consistent across all my interviews, both men and women aspirants are expected to have shown some sort of dedication to the party to be selected as a candidate. In Zambia, party loyalty is shown through either time spent campaigning, mobilizing on behalf of the party, having served as an elected party member, or having financially contributed to the party organs.

In interviews I conducted across the country, the selectorates of both parties stressed the importance of party loyalty and noted how this attribute was especially important for aspiring woman candidates. Women, in line with gender stereotypes, are praised for their inherent and expected party loyalty. In this respect, Zambian party gatekeepers recognize the gendered nature of party loyalty. In one interview, a long time serving party member and selectorate told me that "more women are loyal to the party than men. It's very rare that you find a woman who's not loyal." [6] This is a notable characteristic that is often pointed out when discussing sitting women MPs and their qualifications. When asking the selectorate committee in Katuba constituency why they supported Patricia Mwashingwele, they all agreed it was partly driven by her "loyalty to the party. [7].

Loyalty extends past the individual to the history of the family. Common across many developing party systems, politics can be controlled by local brokers who often keep power within the family. Zambia is no exception. It is common to see politicians with connections to powerful movers among the independence movement or for families to hold multiple positions within the same constituency. These positions often overlap with the control of local traditional authorities. While both men and women benefit from connections to political families, women are more likely to stay within the political affiliation of their family in Zambia because of the constraints women face financially and socially. For example, while Mulenga Sata, the son of former President Michael Sata was able to defect from his father's political party; the PF to the opposition party, UPND, [8] Sylvia Masebo was ultimately forced to divorce her husband when attempting to defect from the former ruling party.[9]

---

[6] Author Interview, Remote; 2020
[7] Author Interview, Lusaka Zambia; September 28, 2017
[8] Author Interview, Lusaka Zambia; October 27th 2017
[9] Author Interview, Chongwe, Zambia; January 2017

Politics is expensive and women often rely on their families' support to fund their campaigns. The cost of elections is especially burdensome to women, as noted by the chairlady of the national executive committee for UPND: "The only excuse I buy for women is that we don't have funds. The politics in Africa require you to have money. And in the opposition, it's worse, where it's not funded by the government. It's worse. That's one big fear that women have...I don't have the money. So why should I go for it?"[10] Even women who are electorally successful in Zambia highlighted their reliance on family resources. Member of Parliament Attractor Chisanga noted how much her family pitched in during the campaign: "There's one sister of mine, she donated hundreds of t-shirts and caps, another sister of mine donated vehicles and fuel and food, and another sister of mine donated some money as well... the family was very supportive.[11]

The necessity of family support is asymmetric in Zambia, where women must negotiate their political ambitions with relatives in ways which men do not. Member of Parliament Olipa Phiri discussed her husbands reticence: My husband at first was on the negative side that, no, you know when women become politicians full time, they start misbehaving ... [he]thinks that [it] will denounce our name. [12] This household bargaining that takes place when women express political ambitions is gendered asymmetrically: when a woman says I am going to run ... almost all of them will be told by their husbands you cant do that or their family will be like why... While if a man runs, the family will say, yeah, you should. [13]

Selectorates in Zambia value loyalty among women aspirants and recognize that coming from a political family sends a strong signal that they are likely to stay in the political party and have the support to run a successful campaign. The manner in which the candidate selection committee evaluated one woman for a seat on the former ruling party ticket in Kafue constituency exemplifies this perspective. Because she was the granddaughter of one of the first members of parliament, the candidate selection committee viewed her as; "riding on the name of the grandfather."[14]. While not

---

[10]Author Interview, Lusaka, Zambia; November 6th, 2017
[11]Author Interview, Lusaka Zambia; October 26, 2017
[12]Author Interview, Lusaka Zambia; October 26, 2017
[13]Author Interview, Lusaka Zambia; September 30, 2017
[14]Author Interview; Remote 2020

enough to guarantee adoption, this candidate's family lineage is a political asset that also shapes views about her access to the necessary resources. Her family's political history creates a patriarchal political path for her as an aspirant.

Political selectorates not only evaluate the candidate's public profile, but also strongly consider their private life as a factor in their candidate selection. Women, valued for their loyalty, are also strongly expected to be the primary caretakers in the home. In Zambia, where Christianity as the official religion dictates traditional family norms, men's and women's roles are culturally ingrained. Women face an impossible double-bind: they either fulfill the cultural expectation of having a family, where domestic responsibilities and household bargaining puts stringent limitations on their resources to commit to politics, or they do not conform and face backlash from the selectorate. "[T]hose who are married...they are respected differently but if you are single, you are a woman, it's also another challenge because even the people would open up, how are going to run, how are you going to represent us, you don't have a child, you don't have a husband, how are you going to do it."[15]

The asymmetrical gendered nature of family status in Zambia affects how selectorates evaluate an aspirant's family status differentially. For men undergoing candidate selection, family status can contribute to their qualifications. By demonstrating they can support a family and successfully fulfill the role as head of household, men in Zambia receive praise. "One of the core, one of the major things which people look [at] is ... how do you keep your family, if you take care of your family, they'll say [he] is a responsible person. If he's taking care of his family, he is able to take care of us as voters. That really matter."[16].

The socio-cultural environment of Zambia, which mirrors many developing democracies in the Global South, presents a landscape where candidate evaluation is gendered. Both individual and family attributes are considered by the selectorate, and women face an inherent disadvantage in the clientelistic systems that value immutable and costly attributes from its women aspirants. Consequently, the majority of the prominent women politicians in Zambia who have made it through the

---

[15]Author Interview; October 17 2017
[16]Author Interview; Remote 2020

18

candidate selection process can be connected to politically active families. Former Vice President Inonge Wina, the first woman to hold the position, was married to the late Arthur Wina, an independence leader and government minister (Thobhani 1974). Member of Parliament Given Katuta was the daughter of a political father who only ended up contesting her seat after her brother died before an election (Zimba 2016). The fatherof Chushi Kasanda, Member of Parliament for Chisamba constituency, was MP for that same seat and her grandfather was MP and Minister for UNIP (a former ruling party) (Kuyela 2016).

4   Research Design

The challenge to understanding the preferences of party gatekeepers is that many attributes come together to form the qualifications of a candidate. To separate the effects of both individual and family-based attributes on candidate evaluation, I utilize a single profile conjoint experiment (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2013). A notable benefit of conjoint designs, as (Clayton et al. 2019) notes is its resilience against social desirability bias; the presence of numerous varying attributes make it unlikely for the participant or enumerator to isolate individual factors in their responses. However, in line with current critiques on the potential biases of inference resulting from relying on the AMCE (Scott F Abramson Working Paper; Bansak et al. 2020), this analysis acknowledges and interprets the results as the average effect rather than the majority. In the context of candidate selection, where a strong preference among a selectorate may have a disproportional effect, the design's potential weakness mirrors the reality of candidate preferences during selection, making it the most appropriate choice.

Experimentally, the survey utilizes a vignette design to present candidate recommendations. These candidate recommendations are based on actual recommendations that each level of the party structure writes and submits to the province and the national executive committee after interviewing candidates during the candidate selection period. The hypothetical recommendations vary the gender of the candidate, the financial capacity, and the organizational capacity of the candidate. Ad-

19

ditionally, the experiment varies marital status and party endorsement. The full conjoint attribute table can be found in the Appendix A1. After hearing the description of the candidate, participants score the candidate and provide recommendations on what the candidate needs to do to be selected. Since the sample is made of selectorate members, each participant is familiar with the task being asked.

Zambian enumerators, recruited from the University of Zambia, conducted the surveys on tablets with selectorate members. The surveys ask participants questions to gauge political experience, candidate preferences, measures of ambivalent sexism, and financial expectations during the multiple phases of candidate selection. On average, the survey took about 45 minutes. The survey instrument and the pre-analysis plan were registered with Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP).[17]

4.1 Candidate Attributes

The experimental attributes were developed to mirror candidate recommendations collected in the field from the PF.[18] The attributes were identified from these records in collaboration with interviews conducted with party selectorates and aspirants. Critical to the design of the experiment were the levels of attributes. First, the experiment includes the individual and family attributes of the candidate. This makes up the first dimension of the two-by-two in Table 1. For example, an aspirant may personally have a business, or their family may have a business. Both, I argue, would be considered when evaluating the candidates ability to support a campaign.

The second stratification is the level of investment of the attribute by the candidate or their family. This makes up the second factor in the two-by-two in Table 1. A candidate may have the resource (capacity) or they could have used the resource for the party (invested). For example, a candidate could have a strong network by being a member of a local organization (they have organizational capacity) or they could have used their network to mobilize election support for the party

---

[17]Egap Registration can be found at https://osf.io/rzje9

[18]This dataset includes 727 written recommendations on aspirants for member of parliament and ward councillor for the 2016 election.

20

(they invested their organizational capacity). Uncommon to the study of candidate evaluation, the design also included a negative qualification for each of the attributes. Candidate evaluations found in the field often included negative aspects about a candidate, and it is important to understand how this information is considered in line with positive information. The baseline for the attributes was no mention of a specific attribute, in the survey, this attribute just did not appear for the enumerator to read.

Table 1: Candidate Attributes

	Capacity	Invested
Personal:	candidate attributes specific to the individual	candidate level of investment in party
Family:	candidate attributes from their family	family level of investment in party

The first critical aspect about an aspirant was their financial resources. Member of Parliament Pililia Jere states this explicitly: "for one to win a political position in this country you have to have money."[19] And Member of Parliament Salatiel Tembo points out that this becomes an insurmountable barrier during candidate selection: "you are not considered because you don't have the money."[20] The experimental design included two measures of a candidate's financial resources: both their capacity and level of investment. For example, personal financial capacity referred to an indicator of wealth and invested financial capacity to a measure of how a candidate has used wealth to the benefit of the party.

The second candidate criterion typically considered is their organizational capacity. Essential to an aspirant's profile is how connected they are to the constituency. One of the most common negatives used in the aspirant records from the PF was "Not on the Ground", signaling that the candidate was not known or connected to the area. The experimental design included two measures of a candidate's organizational capacity, mirroring the financial capacity attributes. Personal organizational capacity referred to the candidate's local connections within the constituency (being an influential member of a local organization). Invested organizational capacity reflected how local

---

[19] Author Interview, Lusaka Zambia; October 30, 2017
[20] Author Interview, Lusaka Zambia; October 27, 2017

ties were utilized for elections - mobilizing campaign support.

In addition to the capacities of the candidate, the design includes an endorsement. Arriola, Choi and Gichohi (2017) show that endorsements have a large impact on support for candidates. In Zambia, the candidate selection process relies on members of the selectorates campaigning for certain candidates. Among the records of candidate evaluations from PF, it was common to see some notes on whether or not the candidate could deliver the seat. Therefore, the design included four levels of endorsements.

Lastly, the study included a description of the candidate's family status. Since the project was focused on the controlling of assets, it was important to understand if women who were single or married were evaluated differently. The gender of the candidate was presented with a non-ethnic gendered names which were taken from the list of aspirants from 2016 and tested prior to the study.

These six candidate attributes combine into a hypothetical candidate profile, mirroring the candidate recommendations from the 2016 candidate selection process. The experimental design was ideal as the recommendations often included numerous attributes, both in positive and negative formulations. For example, in the actual aspirant recommendation shown below, the description offers positive financial capacity and organizational capacity details, but includes a negative endorsement.

> *"He qualifies to stand since he is a strong member of the party (PF) and being a businessman he is very well known in Mpika. The only drawback is that he is still very new in politics, but when groomed properly he can make a strong candidate in the future elections. A stable and eager to learn politics member of Patriotic Front party in Mpika." Actual candidate recommendation for Abraham Kasonde MP Aspirant Mpika Constituency*

4.2   Survey Sample

The experiment was embedded in an in-person survey conducted with 1,339 party selectorates in both the PF and UPND across Zambia. The constituencies were selected to maximize variation on gender participation in 2016 candidate selection: no women applied, a woman applied but was

not selected, a woman was selected but not elected, and a woman was elected. The total sample included 69 constituencies across all ten provinces. (See table A1 in the Appendix for a map of where the survey was conducted).

Table 2 shows the overall characteristics of the individuals in the sample. The descriptive statistics provide an overview of the make-up of the political selectorate in Zambia. The survey sample is made up of 36% women. The age of participants ranged from 23-79 with an average age of 46.3. Only a small portion of the sample have a university degree (12%), and the majority (81%) are married. The sample is equally made up of the lower three strata of party offices - ward, constituency, and district - with a smaller portion in the higher offices of provincial and national.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Candidate Survey Participants

Variable	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max.
PF	1339	.23	.42	0	1
UPND	1339	.75	.43	0	1
Woman	1,284	.36	.48	0	1
Age	1,320	46.3	10.3	23	79
University Degree	1,339	.12	.33	0	1
Married	1339	.81	.40	0	1
Party Level	1173	2.21	1.0	1	5
Ward	345	.25	.43	0	1
Constituency	362	.27	.44	0	1
District	342	.26	.44	0	1
Province	114	.09	.28	0	1
National	10	.007	.09	0	1

The sample of selectorates exhibits a clear gender divide. While we must analyze the sample cautiously because participants were not selected randomly, some stark contrast between the characteristics of men and women do emerge. Reported in Table 3, among the selectorates sampled, women are significantly younger, with an average age of 45.3 in comparison to 46.7 for men. Reflective of the gender gap in access to education, women selectorates are also significantly less likely to have a college education; only 9% of women sample have a university degree in comparison to 15% of men. Notably, women are less likely than the men in the sample to be married. Lastly, men hold significantly more assets than do the women in this sample, mirroring gendered economic

inequalities in Zambia.

Table 3: Differences in Men and Women Selectorates

| Variable	Men	Women	p
Age (year)	46.7	45.3	.00
University	15%	9%	.00
Married	86%	72%	.00
Asset Index (mean)	6.1	5.5	.01

Note: The p values are based on X2 tests.

5   Empirical Analysis

The experiment is analyzed following Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2013) by calculating the average marginal component effect (AMCE) and the average component interaction effect (ACIE). I use the fully non-parametric linear regression estimator presented in Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2013), and clustered standard errors derived at the respondent level. The survey presented participants with 6 profiles and asked them to score each candidate on a 7pt scale. The 7 pt outcome has been scaled to represent the percentage increase or decrease in candidate score.

There is support for Hypothesis 1: Party selectorates do weigh family attributes when evaluating candidates. Figure 4 presents the AMCE from the full sample. The figure shows the point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals for the unconditional AMCEs with standard errors clustered at the respondent level.[21] Figure 4 shows that the effect size is often of the same magnitude for both family and individual attributes. For example, while individually owning businesses increases a candidate's evaluation on average by 4%, having a family that owns businesses also increases a candidate's evaluation on average by 3%. Statistically, these two effect sizes are indistinguishable.

Some of the largest effects in the recommendations come from negative attributes. Often not included in studies of individual preferences on candidates, we see that negative comments in a

---

[21]Attribute levels have been collapsed. variation in the quantity of a capacity was used to give variation in hypothetical candidates across profiles. Findings are robust regardless.

Figure 4: Average Marginal Treatment Effects

candidate endorsement can have the largest impact on the overall evaluation. From this analysis, we can see that a candidate can be severely weakened by having financial challenges with individuals - decreasing a candidate score by 23% on average. Having financial challenges with the political party also decreases a candidate evaluation by 21% on average.

The results suggest that gender alone does not affect a candidate's score. However, if we were to decrease our statistical threshold to the 94% level, we would see a positive effect on a candidate's evaluation when the aspirant is a woman. This is in line with many of the findings in the literature that find a marginal but significant positive effect for the "woman" attribute. Often, as it is shown in this study and many others (Schwarz and Coppock 2021; Schwarz, Hunt and Coppock 2018), in conjoint experiments we may find a positive effect for being a woman when the context, in reality, is at odds, as suggested by the double bind in Teele, Kalla and Rosenbluth (2017) or the paradox of family expectations in Clayton et al. (2019).

The findings for the family dynamic description have effects as would be expected in the context

of Zambia, where traditional family norms are salient. In Zambia, there is a significantly high rate of marriage. For example, in this sample 82% of the participants are married. Candidates therefore received significant increases in their candidate evaluation for being married or married with kids. Candidates were penalized for being divorced, while being widowed had no effect.

Regardless of the nature of the endorsement, any comment on the ability to win the seat has a positive effect. Further study is required to understand the impact of endorsement statements on selectorate preferences. While it was expected that the negative attribute, requiring tremendous work to win the seat, would have negatively impacted the overall evaluation, the results suggest that the treatment was unclear.

It is important to comment on the nature of marginal effect sizes. First, the effect sizes are in line with the majority of factorial studies that look at gender. Schwarz and Coppock (2021) show with a meta-analysis of 67 experiments that the effect of being a woman rather than a man is 2% increase in vote choice. Second, in the context of candidate selection where numerous candidates are competing for a single seat, the small effects in candidate score could be all the difference when it comes to being chosen. In Zambia, only one candidate can be recommended per seat by the provincial chairman. Decisions often come down to very small differences in candidates. Therefore, while an effect size may be relatively small, they tell us much about what is important for selectorate evaluations during selection processes in newer democracies.

5.1 The Gendered Effects of Family Attributes

Core to this paper is the claim that men and women are evaluated differently for the same attributes, namely family-based attributes. We therefore must look at the gendered difference of each attribute. Following the analytical approach seen in Teele, Kalla and Rosenbluth (2017) and Clayton et al. (2019), I calculate the gendered difference which takes the treatment effect if the candidate was a woman minus if they were a man (interaction effect between the gender attribute and the remaining attributes) to find whether the attribute was evaluated differently across the two genders. Positive coefficients show that an attribute has a gender gap in favor of women, and negative coefficients

26

Figure 5: Average Marginal Interaction Effects - Gendered Differences

show a gender gap that favors men.

The results presented in Figure 5, which graphs the average marginal interaction effect (AMIE) with a 95% confidence, support my central claims in Hypothesis 2. I find party selectorates reward women candidates more than men for familial political loyalty. While both men and women are rewarded for individual invested loyalty (shown in Figure 5 in the Appendix), women receive a 4% bonus in comparison to men for having a family that has mobilized in elections, that is, the loyalty mechanism.

Corroborating Hypothesis 3, the results show that party selectorates reward men for demonstrating traditional family status while punishing women who deviate from the norm. The gendered effect for married with two kids results in a 3% bonus for candidates who are men in comparison to women. Additionally, women are penalized severely for being divorced, resulting in a 4% bonus for men.

While this study finds notable gendered effects, it also highlights some null effects where we might expect to find gendered differences. Individual and family financial attributes (invested or not) appear to have no gendered effects: they increase and decrease both men's and women's evalu-

ations indistinguishably. This is especially interesting given that women in newer democracies are in a more vulnerable place financially. Additionally, men and women receive similar evaluations for their local connections. While men are often more likely to be political brokers, and dominate local traditional authorities this appears to have no effect on the evaluation by selectorates on aspirant's local connections.

However, it is important to note that while we find no gendered difference in this analysis, many of these attributes, in reality, are much more difficult for women to obtain or control in the first place. For example, women often face much larger obstacles in obtaining financial independence and/or success in many countries. Women in Latin America and Africa significantly have less access to and ownership of land (Doss, Grown and Deere 2008). In addition to land, women are less likely to own or inherit productive forms of livestock (Dillon and Quiñones 2011; McPeak, Little and Doss 2011). Obtaining similar levels of the attributes where selectorates evaluate men and women the same is often more costly for women, posing a barrier regardless.

What needs to be considered here is that the attributes which selectorates do evaluate men and women differently tend to be immutable by nature. One's family and their political history are not an individual's choice. Nor can political history be built quickly if an individual decides to enter politics. Therefore, women candidates, regardless if they recognize this political advantage, are limited in their ability to act on it: it simply exists as an attribute that is evaluated when they seek office. Further, in new democracies where traditional norms prevail an individual's family dynamic, and whether they remain "not-divorced" is often out of a women's control. What this tells us is that women's descriptive representation will not change by focusing on candidate trainings and increasing the supply of women candidates. We must also look towards training the selectorate to eliminate the gendered differences in evaluation practices.

5.2   What about Women Selectorates?

Many scholars have suggested that the key to decreasing bias against women during the candidate selection process is to include women in party positions of power (Niven 1998; Lovenduski and

Norris 1993; Kittilson 2001). The logic contends that the out-group effect, when a political body dominated by men view women as less qualified, is dampened by women joining selectorate bodies Niven (1998). Women selectorates are also expected to actively work to recruit, often changing internal party policies to promote such ideals (Lovenduski and Norris 1993). Evidence for such claims has been found when studying European (Kittilson 2001) and Canadian political parties (Cheng and Tavits 2011).

Figure 6: Average Marginal Interaction Effects - Women Selectorates

I assess this common expectation by comparing the women and men selectorates in the sample. The results suggest caution in relying on women in political positions to eliminate gender bias in recruitment strategies. Looking at the full conjoint results (Appendix A3), I do not find that women have any gender preference. In fact, while looking at the full sample, there was a significant positive effect if we decreased our test hypothesis to 94% (as we see with the full sample).I find that women selectorates, however, do engage in similar gendered interpretations of a candidate's family status. Figure 6 calculates the gendered difference which takes the treatment effect if the candidate

29

was a woman minus if they were a man (interaction effect between the gender attribute and the remaining attributes) to find whether the attribute was evaluated differently for men and women aspirants when evaluated only by women selectorates. (The point estimates for both the men's and women's profiles can be seen in Figure A4 in the Appendix.) Women selectorates punish women more severely then men selectorates when deviating from the traditional family expectations by being divorced. Women aspirants lose 5% in overall candidate evaluation for being divorced in comparison to divorced men.

Women selectorates, while punishing women candidates more severely, do not appear to reward women for demonstrating family political loyalty. As shown in Figure 6, there are no significant gendered differences on any other variable other than the aspirant being divorced. Women selectorates, unlike the whole selectorate body, do not reward women for having politically active families: they do not respond to the loyalty mechanism.

5.3   Ambivalent Sexism and Candidate Evaluations

Rather than focusing on selectorate gender, I suggest that understanding an individual's underlying sense of ambivalent sexism may provide insight on candidate selection dynamics. Here, I show that sociological gender expectations condition how selectorates evaluate candidates. To examine this, I use a modified version of the ambivalent sexism, which "–measures hostile sexism, sexist antipathy toward women, and benevolent sexism, subjectively favorable, yet patronizing, beliefs about women" (Glick and Fiske 2001, pg. 116).[22] I then created an index measure that captures both hostile and benevolent sexist view. And divided the sample using a dichotomous category of those who fell above and below the mean of the index: those with high levels of ambivalent sexism and those with low levels of benevolent sexism.

Supporting hypothesis 4, individuals with high levels of ambivalent sexism, shown in Figure 7, are more likely to engage in gendered evaluations that negatively impact women's chances during

---

[22]The measure was modified to be appropriate to the Zambian context. The full measure can be found in Figure A7 in the Appendix.

**Figure 7: Average Marginal Interaction Effects - High Ambivalent Sexism**

candidate selection. These individuals are particularly focused on the financial status of the candidate and their family – a 'masculine' characteristic. Comparing the AMIE for men and women profiles, shown in Figure A6 in the Appendix, selectorates reward men far more than women who have financially sponsored the party, resulting in a 4% bonus in their candidate score. Further, they do not reward women at all for having a family who has financially sponsored a party, where they do reward men, resulting in a 5% bonus for men.

Conversely, individuals with low levels of ambivalent sexism, shown in Figure 8, I find are more likely to engage in gendered evaluations that positively impact women's chances during candidate selection. Again, we see gendered evaluations of a candidate's personal and familial invested financial capacity. However, these individuals reward women far more for having personally financially sponsored the party, and for having family that sponsored the party. This results in an overall 7% bonus for women's candidate evaluations.

By looking at the levels of ambivalent sexism held by both men and women selectorates, we discover another reason for why simply increasing the amount of women on the selectorate may not

Figure 8: Average Marginal Interaction Effects - Low Ambivalent Sexism

increase women's access. Women in this sample hold significantly higher levels of sexist beliefs than men. Contrary to expectation, women selectorates in Zambia, I find, have an average ambivalent sexism index of 4.6 out of 6. Men, on the other hand, had an average of 4.4.[23] Breaking the index into its two components, benevolent[24] and hostile sexism[25], we see that women hold significantly stronger benevolent sexist views with an average 3.2 (out of 4) in comparison to men who have and average of 2.8.[26] Men, on the other hand, score significantly higher than women on hostile sexism with an average of 1.5 (out of 2) in comparison to women with an average of 1.3.[27] Both men and women have internalized gendered beliefs that ultimately affect the way they view and evaluate men and women candidates. Women are not immune from these beliefs, and understanding the sociological foundations of how gender is used as a heuristic will further our understanding of the complexities of barriers women face when vying for candidacy.

---

[23]The difference of means based on two-tailed tests is statistically significant (p=0.011).

[24]Includes the following questions: Women should be cherished and protected by men; Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives; Women are more virtuous and good then men; and No matter how accomplished he is, a man is not truly complete as a person unless he has a wife.

[25]Includes the following questions: Women are too easily offended. ; and Most women do not appreciate all the things men do for them.

[26]The difference of means based on two-tailed tests is statistically significant (p=0.000).

[27]The difference of means based on two-tailed tests is statistically significant (p=0.000).

6 Conclusion

Drawing on a unique experimental study of the candidate preferences of party selectorates, I argue that current models of candidate selection are misspecified. Candidates are not solely judged by their individual attributes; they are evaluated based on family resources that are perceived in gendered ways. The conflicting findings from the literature on the role of gender in womens electoral success may be due to the failure to account for these additional attributes. I argue that both parties and voters consider family attributes alongside individual attributes when they evaluate candidates. Further, the evaluation of family attributes is in accordance with gender norms and stereotypes. Party selectorates reward men in candidate selection for having a traditional family dynamic: this reward reflects both a bonus to men who are married with children and a penalty to women who deviate from the traditional family by being divorced. Conversely, with gender expectations and social norms dictating gender stereotypes that imbue women with perceived traits of loyalties, trustworthiness, and dependability, party selectorates reward them over men for the political loyalties of their families.

In advancing the literature, this study contends that to truly understand the gendered nature in which party gatekeepers scrutinize women, and how it differs from men, we must include the unbalanced nature of the influence of the family unit in womens lives around the world. One of the most notable benefits of political families is the collection of resources across generations (Solon 1992), but women do not benefit equally due to inequalities in inheritance laws, social norms, and I add the perception of access on the behalf of selectorates. Women and their ability to compete in elections are heavily moderated by the support and resources of their families.

This study provides a unique look into a group of understudied political actors: the party selectorate – whose opinions and actions ultimately shape women's representation in new democracies. I find that a common policy recommendations for increasing the number of women in decision-making bodies, like the selectorate, should decrease the biases of those looking for entry. However, this study suggests caution on this recommendation. Women are not immune to gender biases and have their own embedded biases to contend with. Women selectorates, while punishing women can-

didates more severely, do not appear to reward women for demonstrating family political loyalty. Furthermore, when looking at the degree to which individuals hold sexist beliefs, I find that women score significantly higher on the ambivalent sexism measure than men in the sample. Therefore, the solution to decreasing biases against women may not be as simple as increasing the number of women on selection committees. But rather must lie in training selectoarate members on unbiased evaluation techniques and strategies to root out implicit gender biases that ultimately affect the institutionalization of democracies around the world.

References

Aguilar, Rosario, Saul Cunow and Scott Desposato. 2015. "Choice sets, gender, and candidate choice in Brazil." *Electoral Studies* 39:230–242.

Alexander, Deborah and Kristi Andersen. 1993. "Gender as a Factor in the Attribution of Leadership Traits." *Political Research Quarterly* 46(3):527–545.

Arriola, Leonardo R, Donghyun Danny Choi, Justine M Davis, Melanie L Phillips and Lise Rakner. 2021. "Paying to party: Candidate resources and party switching in new democracies." *Party Politics* p. 1354068821989563.

Arriola, Leonardo R, Donghyun Danny Choi and Matthew Gichohi. 2017. "Political endorsements and cross-ethnic voting in Africa." *Draft. URL: http://cpd. berkeley. edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ACG Endorsement-1. pdf* .

Asako, Yasushi, Takeshi Iida, Tetsuya Matsubayashi and Michiko Ueda. 2014. "Dynastic politicians: Theory and evidence from Japan." *Waseda University Organization for Japan-US Studies Working Paper* (201201).

Bansak, Kirk, Jens Hainmueller, Daniel J Hopkins and Teppei Yamamoto. 2020. "Using conjoint experiments to analyze elections: The essential role of the Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE)." *Available at SSRN 3588941* .

Baturo, Alexander and Julia Gray. 2018. "When do family ties matter? The duration of female suffrage and womens path to high political office." *Political Research Quarterly* 71(3):695–709.

Bell, Melissa A and Karen M Kaufmann. 2015. "The electoral consequences of marriage and motherhood: How gender traits influence voter evaluations of female candidates." *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy* 36(1):1–21.

Bem, Sandra L. 1981. "Bem sex role inventory." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* .

Bem, Sandra L and Steven A Lewis. 1975. "Sex role adaptability: One consequence of psychological androgyny." *Journal of personality and Social Psychology* 31(4):634.

Besley, Timothy and Marta Reynal-Querol. 2017. "The logic of hereditary rule: theory and evidence." *Journal of Economic Growth* 22(2):123–144.

Bleck, Jaimie and Kristin Michelitch. 2018. "Is womens empowerment associated with political knowledge and opinions? Evidence from rural Mali." *World Development* 106:299–323.

Bos, Angela L. 2011. "Out of control: Delegates' information sources and perceptions of female candidates." *Political Communication* 28(1):87–109.

Broverman, Inge K, Susan Raymond Vogel, Donald M Broverman, Frank E Clarkson and Paul S Rosenkrantz. 1972. "SexRole Stereotypes: A Current Appraisal 1." *Journal of Social issues* 28(2):59–78.

Brule, Rachel and Nikhar Gaikwad. N.d. "Culture, capital and the political economy gender gap: Evidence from Meghalayas matrilineal tribes.".

Burkart, Mike, Fausto Panunzi and Andrei Shleifer. 2003. "Family firms." *The journal of finance* 58(5):2167–2201.

Cheng, Christine and Margit Tavits. 2011. "Informal influences in selecting female political candidates." *Political Research Quarterly* 64(2):460–471.

Chhibber, Pradeep. 2002. "Why are some women politically active? The household, public space, and political participation in India." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 43(3-5):409–429.

Clayton, Amanda, Amanda Lea Robinson, Martha C Johnson and Ragnhild Muriaas. 2019. "(How) Do Voters Discriminate Against Women Candidates? Experimental and Qualitative Evidence From Malawi." *Comparative Political Studies* 53(3-4):601–630.

Clayton, Amanda and Pär Zetterberg. 2020. "Gender and Party Discipline: Evidence from Africa's Emerging Party Systems.".

Confessore, Nicholas. 2015. "Koch brothers budget of $889 million for 2016 is on par with both parties spending." *The New York Times* 26.

Cowley, Philip and Sarah Childs. 2003. "Too spineless to rebel? New Labour's women MPs." *British Journal of Political Science* pp. 345–365.

Crowder-Meyer, Melody. 2013. "Gendered recruitment without trying: how local party recruiters affect women's representation." *Politics Gender* 9(4):390–413.

Dillon, Andrew and Esteban J Quiñones. 2011. "Gender differentiated asset dynamics in Northern Nigeria.".

Dodson, Debra L. 1997. "Change and continuity in the relationship between private responsibilities and public officeholding: The more things change, the more they stay the same." *Policy Studies Journal* 25(4):569–584.

Doss, Cheryl, Caren Grown and Carmen Diana Deere. 2008. *Gender and asset ownership: a guide to collecting individual-level data*. The World Bank.

Eagly, Alice H and Amanda B Diekman. 2005. "What is the problem? Prejudice as an attitude-in-context." *On the nature of prejudice: Fifty years after Allport* pp. 19–35.

Feinstein, Brian D. 2010. "The dynasty advantage: Family ties in congressional elections." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 35(4):571–598.

Folke, Olle, Johanna Karin Rickne and Daniel M Smith. 2020. "Gender and Dynastic Political Selection." *Available at SSRN 2985230* .

Fox, Richard L and Eric RAN Smith. 1998. "The role of candidate sex in voter decisionmaking." *Political Psychology* 19(2):405–419.

Fréchette, Guillaume R, Francois Maniquet and Massimo Morelli. 2008. "Incumbents' interests and gender quotas." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4):891–909.

Gallagher, Michael and Michael Marsh. 1988. *Candidate selection in comparative perspective: The secret garden of politics*. Vol. 18 Sage Publications Ltd.

Glick, Peter and Susan T Fiske. 2001. Ambivalent sexism. In *Advances in experimental social psychology*. Vol. 33 Elsevier pp. 115–188.

Hainmueller, Jens, Daniel J Hopkins and Teppei Yamamoto. 2013. "Causal inference in conjoint analysis: Understanding multidimensional choices via stated preference experiments." *Political Analysis* 22(1):1–30.

Hassim, Shireen. 2003. "Representation, participation and democratic effectiveness: Feminist challenges to representative democracy in South Africa.".

Hinojosa, Magda and Ana Vijil Gurdián. 2012. "Alternate paths to power? Women's political representation in Nicaragua." *Latin American Politics and Society* 54(4):61–88.

Holman, Mirya R, Jennifer L Merolla and Elizabeth J Zechmeister. 2016. "Terrorist threat, male stereotypes, and candidate evaluations." *Political Research Quarterly* 69(1):134–147.

Huddy, Leonie and Nayda Terkildsen. 1993. "Gender stereotypes and the perception of male and female candidates." *American journal of political science* pp. 119–147.

Ichino, Nahomi and Noah L Nathan. 2016. "Democratizing the party: The effects of primary election reforms in Ghana.".

Iversen, Torben and Frances Rosenbluth. 2006. "The political economy of gender: Explaining crossnational variation in the gender division of labor and the gender voting gap." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(1):1–19.

Judd, Charles M and Bernadette Park. 1988. "Out-group homogeneity: Judgments of variability at the individual and group levels." *Journal of personality and social psychology* 54(5):778.

Jussim, Lee, Lerita M Coleman and Lauren Lerch. 1987. "The nature of stereotypes: A comparison and integration of three theories." *Journal of personality and social psychology* 52(3):536.

Kage, Rieko, Frances M. Rosenbluth and Seiki Tanaka. 2019. "What Explains Low Female Political Representation? Evidence from Survey Experiments in Japan." *Politics amp; Gender* 15(2):285309.

Kasapovi, Mirjana and Ivan iber. 2001. "Electoral policy and the determinants of electoral behaviour in Croatia (1990-2000)." *Central European Political Science Review* 2(3):112–139.

Khan, Sarah. 2017. "Personal is Political: Prospects for Womens Substantive Representation in Pakistan.".

King, David C and Richard E Matland. 2003. "Sex and the grand old party: An experimental investigation of the effect of candidate sex on support for a Republican candidate." *American Politics Research* 31(6):595–612.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 2000. "Linkages between citizens and politicians in democratic polities." *Comparative political studies* 33(6-7):845–879.

Kittilson, Miki Caul. 2001. *Challenging the organization, changing the rules: Women, parties, and change in Western Europe, 1975 to 1997*. University of California, Irvine.

Kongkirati, Prajak. 2016. "Evolving power of provincial political families in Thailand:Dynastic power, party machine and ideological politics." *South East Asia Research* 24(3):386–406.
   URL: *https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0967828X16659570*

Kuyela, Teddy. 2016.
   URL: *http://www.daily-mail.co.zm/kasanda-chisambas-1st-female-mp/*

Lawless, Jennifer L. 2004. "Women, war, and winning elections: Gender stereotyping in the post-September 11th era." *Political Research Quarterly* 57(3):479–490.

Lawless, Jennifer L and Richard L Fox. 2005. *It takes a candidate: Why women don't run for office*. Cambridge University Press.

Leston-Bandeira, Cristina and André Freire. 2003. "Internalising the lessons of stable democracy: the Portuguese Parliament." *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 9(2):56–84.

Lovenduski, Joni and Pippa Norris. 1993. *Gender and party politics*. Sage.

Lowes, Sara. 2017. "Matrilineal kinship and spousal cooperation: Evidence from the matrilineal belt." *Unpublished manuscript. URL: https://scholar. harvard. edu/files/slowes/files/lowes*$_m$atrilineal.pdf.

McPeak, John G, Peter D Little and Cheryl R Doss. 2011. *Risk and social change in an African rural economy: livelihoods in pastoralist communities*. Vol. 7 Routledge.

Mitra, Subrata K. 1988. "India: dynastic rule or the democratisation of power?" *Third World Quarterly* 10(1):129–159.

Mo, Cecilia Hyunjung. 2015. "The Consequences of Explicit and Implicit Gender Attitudes and Candidate Quality in the Calculations of Voters." *Political Behavior* 37(2):357–395. **URL:** *https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-014-9274-4*

Niven, David. 1998. "Party elites and women candidates: The shape of bias." *Women Politics* 19(2):57–80.

Norris, Pippa and Joni Lovenduski. 1995. *Political recruitment: Gender, race and class in the British Parliament*. Cambridge University Press.

O'Brien, Diana Z. 2015. "Rising to the top: Gender, political performance, and party leadership in parliamentary democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(4):1022–1039.

Paul, David and Jessi L Smith. 2008. "Subtle sexism? Examining vote preferences when women run against men for the presidency." *Journal of Women, Politics Policy* 29(4):451–476.

Polachek, Solomon W and Jeff Xiang. 2009. "The gender pay gap across countries: A human capital approach.".

Querubin, Pablo. N.d. Political reform and elite persistence: Term limits and political dynasties in the Philippines. In *APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper*.

Richter, Linda K. 1990. "Exploring theories of female leadership in South and Southeast Asia." *Pacific Affairs* pp. 524–540.

Sanbonmatsu, Kira. 2006. "Do parties know that women win? Party leader beliefs about women's electoral chances." *Politics Gender* 2(4):431–450.

Schwarz, Susanne and Alexander Coppock. 2021. "What Have We Learned About Gender From Candidate Choice Experiments? ăA Meta-analysis of 67 Factorial Survey Experiments." *The Journal of Politics* 0(ja):null.
URL: *https://doi.org/10.1086/716290*

Schwarz, Susanne, William Hunt and Alexander Coppock. 2018. "What have we learned about gender from candidate choice experiments? A meta-analysis of 30 factorial survey experiments." *Unpublished manuscript* .

Scott F Abramson, Korhan Koçak, Asya Magazinnik. Working Paper. "What Do We Learn About Voter Preferences From Conjoint Experiments?".

Siavelis, Peter. 2002. "The hidden logic of candidate selection for Chilean parliamentary elections." *Comparative Politics* pp. 419–438.

Smith, Daniel M and Shane Martin. 2017. "Political dynasties and the selection of cabinet ministers." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 42(1):131–165.

Smith, Daniel Markham. 2012. Succeeding in politics: dynasties in democracies Thesis.

Solon, Gary. 1992. "Intergenerational income mobility in the United States." *The American Economic Review* pp. 393–408.

Stalsburg, Brittany L. 2010. "Voting for mom: The political consequences of being a parent for male and female candidates." *Politics & Gender* 6(3):373.

Tamale, Sylvia. 2018. *When hens begin to crow: Gender and parliamentary politics in Uganda*. Routledge.

Teele, Dawn, Joshua Kalla and Frances McCall Rosenbluth. 2017. "The ties that double bind: social roles and women's underrepresentation in politics." *Available at SSRN 2971732* .

Thames, Frank C and Mikhail Rybalko. 2010. "Gender and Legislative Behavior in Post-Communist Ukraine." *Journal of East European and Asian Studies, Forthcoming* .

Thobhani, Akbarali. 1974.

Thomas, Sue. 2002. "The personal is the political: Antecedents of gendered choices of elected representatives." *Sex Roles* 47(7):343–353.

Vilas, Carlos M. 1992. "Family affairs: class, lineage and politics in contemporary Nicaragua." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 24(2):309–341.

Wang, Vibeke and Ragnhild Louise Muriaas. 2019. "Candidate selection and informal soft quotas for women: gender imbalance in political recruitment in Zambia." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 7(2):401–411.

Zimba, Jack. 2016.

URL: *http://www.daily-mail.co.zm/katuta-miracle-child-born-to-rule/*

Appendix

Selectorates for the survey were selected from 69 constituencies across all ten provinces. Enumerators worked through local party branches to contact members of the selectorate from UPND and PF in each selected constituency.

Figure A1: Survey Sample

Table A1: Conjoint Analysis Attributes

| Attributes	Attribute levels
Personal Financial Capacity	[Blank]
	Their family has a successful business
	Their family has multiple successful businesses
	They own a successful business
	They own multiple successful businesses
	Has financial challenges with other individuals
Invested Financial Capacity	[Blank]
	Their family has financially sponsored the party structure
	Their family has financially sponsored the party structure and constituency developr
	One They have personally financially sponsored party structure
	Two They have personally financially sponsored party structure and constituency de
	Has financial challenges with the party
Personal Organizational Capacity	[Blank]
	Family is a leading member in an influential local organization
	Family is a leading member in many influential local organizations
	They are a leading member in an influential local organization
	They are a leading member in many influential local organizations
	Does not have any connections in the constituency
Invested Organizational Capacity	[Blank]
	Family has mobilized support for one election campaign
	Family has mobilized support for many election campaigns
	They have personally mobilized support for one election campaign
	They have personally mobilized support for many election campaigns
	Has not assisted with party mobilization or party events
Marital Status	[Blank]
	Married
	Married with two young kids
	Divorced
	Widowed
Endorsement	[Blank]
	Can deliver us the seat
	With some work can deliver us the seat
	With a tremendous amount of hard work, they might be able to deliver us the seat
Gender	Woman
	Man

A2

Figure A2: Average Marginal Interaction Effects - Full Sample

Figure A3: Average Marginal Treatment Effects - Women Selectorates

**Figure A4: Men and Women Profiles - Women Selectorates**


Estimated AMCE

**Figure A5: AMIE - High Level of Ambivalent Sexism**

Figure A6: AMIE - Low Level of Ambivalent Sexism

Figure A7: Ambivalent Sexism Measure

Below is a series of statements concerning men and women and their relationships in contemporary society. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each statement. Enumerator: Please read each individually

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Women are too easily offended.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Women are more virtuous and good then men.	○	○	○	○	○	○
No matter how accomplished he is, a man is not truly complete as a person unless he has a wife	○	○	○	○	○	○
Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Women should be cherished and protected by men.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Most women do not appreciate all the things men do for them.	○	○	○	○	○	○